Reviews

The contradictions encountered in the experimental knowledge of a subject indicate the impossibility of its logical, conceptual understanding, its transcendental essence. That's all!
Hegel, in contradiction, sought a tool for transcendental (speculative) thinking. Based on practically identified contradictions, he built new ones, remaining in the sphere of theoretical reason, “generating chimeras.”
You have shown quite well that Hegel’s method can be modeled by reason (according to a reflexive scheme), without achieving the desired identity of being and thinking.
It is possible that your diagram can quite possibly be used to simulate development processes. But not more.
The secrets of being and thinking are not accessible to the attempts of practical reason. Entrance to them is only through the mind of Vera! Just don’t rely on the concept of faith, you will remain in practical reason.

Alex! Philosophy, according to Aristotle’s definition, is the science of the first principles of being. Let's take Democrats and Republicans for example. I believe that democrats are rationalists who live by the laws and logic of classical physics. And the Republicans are naturalists, for whom they started: quantum physics, randomness and the law of increasing entropy. Democrats use forms of knowledge - the essence of genera, and Republicans use forms of knowledge - the essence of species. However, these two opposites are subject to a single dialectical logic of Hegel. The most important first reason for being, according to Aristotle, is “purpose”. The purpose of dialectical logic is to show how the unity and struggle of opposites develops, what is the structure of this system, which consists of a sequence of meta-leaps. What comes first: “the chicken or the egg?” Each opposite BELIEVES in its choice! Until the bitter end!!!
Best regards, Vitaly

"The purpose of dialectical logic is to show how the unity and struggle of opposites develops." Show, with imitate. Hegel did this, but he failed to predict, to accomplish development logically. Development has no implical connections; it has an incomprehensibility that goes beyond the limits of understanding. And don't confuse "the hope of contradictions (the chicken and the egg)" with Faith.

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The scientist, both theorist and experimenter, formulates statements or systems of statements and tests them step by step. In the field of empirical sciences, in particular, a scientist puts forward hypotheses or systems of theories and tests them empirically through observation and experiment.

I believe that the task of the logic of scientific research, or, in other words, the logic of knowledge, is the logical analysis of this procedure, that is, the analysis of the method of the empirical sciences.

What are these “methods of empirical sciences”? And what do we call “empirical science” anyway?

1. The problem of induction

According to the widely held view, which I argue against in this book, the empirical sciences are characterized by the use of so-called “inductive methods”. If we adhere to this view, then the logic of scientific research will have to be identified with inductive logic, that is, with the logical analysis of inductive methods.

An output is usually called “inductive” if it is directed away from singular statements(sometimes also called “personal statements”) such as reports on the results of observations or experiments to universal sayings type of hypotheses or theories.

From a logical point of view, the justification of our actions to derive universal statements from singular ones, regardless of the number of the latter, is far from obvious, since any conclusion derived in this way can always turn out to be false. No matter how many examples of the appearance of white swans we observe, all this does not justify the conclusion: “All swans are white.”

The question of the justification of inductive inferences, or, in other words, of the conditions under which such inferences are justified, is known as "problem of induction".

The problem of induction can also be formulated as a question about the validity or truth of universal statements based on experience - hypotheses and theoretical systems in the empirical sciences. Many people are convinced that the truth of such universal statements “known from experience.” However, it is clear that the description of any experience - an observation or the result of an experiment - can only be expressed by a singular statement and is in no way a universal statement. Accordingly, when they say about a certain universal statement that its truth is known to us from experience, they usually mean that the question of the truth of this universal statement can somehow be reduced to the question of the truth of singular statements that are recognized as true on the basis of existing experience. In other words, it is argued that universal statements are based on inductive inferences. Therefore, when we ask whether the laws of nature we know are true, this is simply a different formulation of the question about the logical justification of inductive inferences.

If we seek to find ways to justify inductive inferences, we must first establish principle of induction. Such a principle must take the form of a statement with the help of which we could present inductive conclusions in a logically acceptable form. In the eyes of proponents of inductive logic, nothing is more important to the scientific method than the principle of induction. “...This principle,” states Reichenbach, “determines the truth of scientific theories. Removing it from science would mean nothing more and nothing less than depriving science of its ability to distinguish between the truth and falsity of its theories. Without him, science would obviously no longer have the right to talk about the difference between its theories and the whimsical and arbitrary creations of the poetic mind.”

At the same time, the principle of induction cannot have the character of a purely logical truth, such as a tautology or analytical statement. Indeed, if there were something like a purely logical principle of induction, then there would be no problem of induction, since in this case all inductive conclusions should be considered as purely logical, tautological transformations, analogous to the conclusions of deductive logic. Thus, the principle of induction must be a synthetic statement, that is, a statement whose negation is not self-contradictory, but on the contrary, it is logically possible. This raises the question of why we should accept this principle at all and how, on rational grounds, we can justify this acceptance.

Proponents of inductive logic are keen to declare with Reichenbach that “the principle of induction is unconditionally accepted by all science: and that in everyday life no one seriously expresses doubts about this Principle.” And yet, even assuming that the above statement is true - although, of course, “all science” can be wrong - I declare that the principle of induction is completely unnecessary and, moreover, it inevitably leads to logical contradictions.

The fact that such contradictions arise in connection with the principle of induction is clearly shown by Hume. Hume also found that resolving these contradictions, if possible at all, faces serious difficulties. Indeed, the principle of induction should be a universal statement. Therefore, in any attempt to deduce its truth from experience, the same problems for the solution of which this principle was introduced will again arise in full. Thus, in order to justify the principle of induction, we need to apply inductive conclusions, to justify these latter we have to introduce an inductive principle of a higher order, and so on in the same spirit. Consequently, the attempt to justify the principle of induction on the basis of experience necessarily fails, since it inevitably leads to an infinite regress.

Kant tried to offer his own way of overcoming this difficulty by arguing that the principle of induction (which he formulated as the “principle of universal causation”) is “true a priori.” However, his inventive attempt to construct an a priori justification for synthetic statements, it seems to me, was not successful.

From my point of view, the described difficulties arising in inductive logic are insurmountable. The same can be said about the difficulties arising within the framework of the now widespread theory according to which inductive inference, although not “strictly certain,” is nevertheless may acquire some degree of “reliability” or probability.” In this theory, inductive inferences are “probable inferences” (see ). (We have described, says Reichenbach, the principle of induction as the means by which science recognizes truth. More precisely, we would have to say that it serves to determine probability, for science is not given the opportunity to completely discover either truth or falsity... scientific statements can only acquire degrees of probability, the unattainable upper and lower limits of which are truth and falsehood.”

At this stage of my discussion I will allow myself to neglect the fact that the proponents of inductive logic use the concept of probability, which I will later reject due to its complete inadequacy for their own purposes. I can ignore the concept of probability for now due to the fact that the mentioned difficulties of inductive logic have nothing to do with appealing to probability. Indeed, if a certain degree of probability is to be attributed to statements based on inductive inference, then this can only be justified by introducing (of course, with appropriate modifications) a new principle of induction. Then this new principle will, in turn, have to be subjected to a justification procedure, etc. Moreover, we will not move even if we consider the principle of induction not “true”, but only “probable”. In short, the logic of probabilistic inference, or “probabilistic logic,” like any other form of inductive logic, leads either to bad infinity or to the doctrine apriorism(see also below, Chapter X).

The logical theory, which will be developed further, directly and directly opposes all attempts to act based on the ideas of inductive logic. It could be defined as a theory deductive verification method or as the view according to which a hypothesis can be check only empirically and only after the way it was put forward.

Before proceeding to develop and present this concept (which could be called “deductivism” in contrast to “inductivism”), I must first clarify the difference between psychology of cognition, which deals with empirical facts, and logic of knowledge, which considers only logical relations. Let us note that the belief in inductive logic owes its origin primarily to a mixture of psychological and epistemological problems. It is also useful to note, by the way, that such confusion causes difficulties not only in the logic of knowledge, but also in psychology itself.

2. Elimination of psychologism

I have already said that the activity of a scientist is to put forward and test theories.

The initial stage of this process - the act of conceiving and creating a theory - in my deep conviction, does not require logical analysis, and is not subject to it. The question of the ways in which a new idea - be it a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory - comes to a person may be of significant interest to empirical psychology, but it is completely irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. Logical analysis does not affect questions about facts(Kant’s quid facti?), but concerns only questions about justification or justification(Kantian quid juris?). Questions of the second type are as follows: can a certain statement be justified? If possible, then how? Is this statement verifiable? Does it logically depend on some other statements? Or maybe contradicts them? In order to subject a certain statement to logical analysis, it must be presented to us. Someone must first formulate such a statement and then subject it to logical examination.

In accordance with what has been said, I will clearly distinguish between the process of creating a new idea, on the one hand, and the methods and results of its logical research, on the other. As for the task of the logic of knowledge - in contrast to the psychology of knowledge - I will proceed from the premise that it consists exclusively in the study of the methods used in those systematic tests to which any new idea should be subjected, if, of course, it deserves serious consideration to yourself.

Perhaps it will be objected to me that it would be much easier to achieve this goal if the task of epistemology is considered to be the construction of the so-called “rational reconstruction” those steps that led the scientist to the discovery of the second new truth. However, in this case the question arises: what, strictly speaking, do we want to reconstruct? If the subject of our reconstruction is the teccbi involved in the emergence and manifestation of inspiration, then I refuse to consider this a task of logic. Such processes are the subject of empirical psychology, not logic. It’s another matter if we want to rationally reconstruct subsequent checks, by which it can be established that the fruit of inspiration represents discovery or knowledge. Since the scientist critically evaluates, measures, or rejects the fruits of his own inspiration, we can, if we wish, regard such methodological analysis as a kind of “rational reconstruction” of the relevant processes of thought. However, such a reconstruction does not describe the actual course of the processes under consideration: it can only provide the logical skeleton of the verification procedure. And this, apparently, is all that those researchers who speak of a “rational reconstruction” of the ways of acquiring knowledge mean by this procedure.

My arguments presented in this book are completely independent of the solution to this problem. Since we are still talking about this, my view on this issue briefly boils down to the following: there is neither a logical method for obtaining new ideas, nor a logical reconstruction of this process. I will express my point quite accurately by saying that every discovery contains an “irrational element” or “creative intuition” in the Bergsonian sense. Similarly, Einstein speaks of “the search for those highly universal laws... from which, by pure deduction, a picture of the world can be obtained. There is no logical path, he continues, leading to such... laws. They can only be obtained by intuition based on a phenomenon similar to intellectual love (“Einfuhlung”) for the objects of experience.”

3. Deductive testing of theories

According to the concept developed in this book, the method of critically testing theories and selecting them based on the results of such testing always follows the following path. From some new idea, formulated tentatively and not yet justified in any respect - some anticipation, hypothesis or theoretical system - consequences are deduced by logical deduction. The resulting consequences are then compared with each other and with other corresponding statements in order to discover the logical relations existing between them (such as equivalence, derivability, compatibility or incompatibility).

It seems possible to distinguish four different ways in which a theory is tested. Firstly, this is a logical comparison of the obtained consequences with each other, with the help of which the internal consistency of the system is checked. Secondly, it is an examination of the logical form of a theory in order to determine whether it has the character of an empirical or scientific theory or, for example, is tautological. Third, it is a comparison of a given theory with other theories, mainly to determine whether the new theory will contribute to scientific progress if: it survives its various tests. And finally, fourthly, this is a test of the theory through the empirical application of the consequences derived from it.

The purpose of tests of the latter type is to find out to what extent the new consequences of the theory under consideration, that is, everything that is new in its content, satisfy the requirements of practice, regardless of whether these requirements come from purely scientific experiments or practical, technical applications. The verification procedure is deductive. From this theory, with the help of other previously accepted statements, certain singular statements are derived that can be called “predictions,” especially predictions that are easily verifiable or directly applicable. From them, statements are selected that are not deducible from the hitherto accepted theory, and especially those that contradict it. We then try to make some judgment about these (and other) inferential statements by comparing them with the results of practical applications and experiments. If such a decision is positive, that is, if the singular consequences turn out to be acceptable, or verified, then the theory can now be considered to have stood the test and we have no reason to abandon it. But if the decision made is negative or, in other words, if the consequences turned out to be falsified then falsifying them falsifies the very theory from which they were logically derived.

It should be emphasized that a positive decision can only support a theory temporarily, since subsequent possible negative decisions can always refute it. To the extent that a theory has withstood detailed and rigorous testing and is not overcome by another theory in the course of scientific progress, we can say that our theory has “proven its stability” or, in other words, that it has been “corroborated” by past experience.

Let us note that in the theory-testing procedure we have briefly outlined there is no trace of inductive logic. In our reasoning, the possibility of a transition from the truth of singular statements to the truth of theories is not assumed anywhere, just as nowhere is it assumed that on the basis of “verified” consequences the “truth” of a theory or at least its “probability” can be established.

In this book I will undertake a more detailed analysis of deductive testing methods. And I will try to show that within the framework of such an analysis it is possible to consider all the problems that are usually called “epistemological-logical”. The same problems that are generated by the special needs of inductive logic can be eliminated without replacing them with new problems.

4. The problem of demarcation

Of the many objections that can, in all likelihood, be raised against the concept I am developing, this is perhaps the most serious. By rejecting the method of induction, I can say that I deprive empirical science of those features that seem to be most characteristic of it. This means that I remove the barriers that separate science from metaphysical speculation. My answer to this objection is as follows: the main reason that prompted me to abandon inductive logic is precisely that it does not establish a suitable distinctive feature empirical, non-metaphysical nature of theoretical systems, or, in other words, suitable “demarcation criterion.

The problem of finding a criterion that would give us the means to identify the difference between the empirical sciences, on the one hand, and mathematics, logic and “metaphysical” systems, on the other, I call problem of demarcation.

This problem was already known to Hume, who attempted to solve her. Since Kant, it has become the central problem of the theory of knowledge. If, following Kant, we call the problem of induction “Hume’s problem,” then we can well call the problem of demarcation “Kant’s problem.”

Of these two problems, in which lies the source of almost all other problems of the theory of knowledge, the more fundamental, in my opinion, is the problem of demarcation. Indeed, the main reason that forces empiricist-minded epistemologists to blindly rely on the “method of induction” is their belief that only this method can provide us with a suitable criterion of demarcation. This statement applies especially to those empiricists who march under the banner of “positivism.”

The positivists of earlier times tended to recognize as scientific or legal only those concepts(conceptions or ideas), which, as they put it, “derived from experience,” that is, these concepts, as they believed, are logically reducible to elements of sensory experience - sensations (or sense data), impressions, perceptions, elements of visual or auditory memory and so on. Modern positivists have managed to develop a clearer view of science. For them, science is not a system of concepts, but a system statements. Accordingly, they tend to recognize as scientific or legitimate only statements that can be reduced to elementary (or “atomic”) statements about experience—“perceptual judgments,” “atomic statements,” “protocol sentences,” or something similar. It is obvious that the criterion of demarcation implied in this case is identical to the requirement of constructing inductive logic.

Since I reject inductive logic, I must also reject all such attempts to solve the problem of demarcation. In this regard, the problem of demarcation becomes even more important for our research. Finding an acceptable criterion of demarcation should be the touchstone for any epistemology that does not resort to inductive logic.

Positivists usually interpret the problem of demarcation naturalistically, as if it were a problem belonging to the purview of the natural sciences. Instead of considering it their task to put forward an acceptable convention, they believe that it is necessary to discover the difference between science, on the one hand, and metaphysics, on the other, existing, so to speak, in the very nature of things. They are constantly trying to prove that metaphysics, by its very nature, is nothing more than meaningless chatter - “sophistry and error,” in the words of Hume, which would best be “thrown into the fire.”

If we did not give the words “meaningless” and “no meaning” any other meaning than, according to their definition, “not belonging to empirical science,” then the characterization of metaphysics as meaningless nonsense would be trivial, since metaphysics is usually defined by its “ non-empirical." However, positivists believe that more can be said about metaphysics than simply stating the non-empirical character of some of its statements. The words “irrelevant” and “meaningless” convey and are intended to convey a derogatory assessment. There is no doubt that it is not the successful demarcation of science and metaphysics that is the real goal of the positivists. They rather strive to completely abolish and destroy metaphysics. However, be that as it may, we discover every time that all attempts by positivists to clarify the meaning of the expression “meaningful” lead to the same result - to the definition of a “meaningful (meaningful) sentence” (as opposed to a “meaningless pseudo-sentence "), which simply repeats the criterion of demarcation characteristic of the one they defend inductive logic.

This state of affairs clearly “reveals itself” in the views of Wittgenstein, according to whom every meaningful statement must be logically reducible to elementary (or atomic) statements, which he understands as descriptions or “images of reality” (by the way, such an understanding, in his opinion, is intended to cover all meaningful statements). From this it is quite clear that the Wittgensteinian criterion of meaningfulness coincides with the inductivist criterion of demarcation, provided that we replace the words “scientific” or “legal” used in the latter case with “meaningful”. Thus, it is the unsolved problem of induction that causes the complete failure of positivists’ attempts to solve the problem of demarcation. In their desire to destroy metaphysics, positivists destroy the natural sciences along with it, since the laws of science, just like metaphysical statements, are irreducible to elementary statements about sensory experience. With the consistent application of Wittgenstein's criterion of meaningfulness, one has to discard as unimportant those very laws of nature, the search for which, according to Einstein, is “the highest task of the physicist.” Such laws, according to Wittgenstein's criterion, can in no way be considered genuine, or admissible, statements. Wittgenstein's attempt to show that the problem of induction is an empty pseudo-problem was described by Speke as follows: “The problem of induction consists in the demand for logical justification universal sayings about reality.. We, along with Hume, admit that such a logical justification does not exist. It cannot exist simply because universal statements are not genuine statements.”(italics mine).

Our analysis thus shows in what sense the inductivist criterion of demarcation is unable to help us draw the line between scientific and metaphysical systems and why it should accord them equal status. The fact is that, according to the verdict rendered on the basis of the positivist dogma of meaning, both science and metaphysics are systems of meaningless pseudo-statements. Therefore, instead of expelling metaphysics from the empirical sciences, positivism, on the contrary, leads to the introduction of metaphysics into the sphere of science. (See section 78 and also , .)

In contrast to such anti-metaphysical tricks - anti-metaphysical, of course, only in their intentions - I do not set as my goal the overthrow of metaphysics. Rather, I would like to formulate an acceptable specification of empirical science, or to define the concepts “empirical science” and “metaphysics” in such a way that we can determine for any given system of statements whether its investigation is the work of empirical science or not.

In accordance with the above, my criterion of demarcation should be considered as proposing an agreement or convention. As to the acceptability of any particular such convention, opinions may differ on this matter and acceptable discussion on these issues is possible only between parties who have some common goal. The choice of this goal must, of course, ultimately be a matter of decision that goes beyond rational justification.

Those philosophers who consider the result and goal of science to be a system of absolutely reliable and ultimately true statements will undoubtedly reject the agreement I put forward. The same will be done by those who see “the essence of science ... in its dignity,” which, in their opinion, lies in its “integrity,” in its “real truth and essence.” It is unlikely that these philosophers will agree to recognize this dignity of modern theoretical physics, in which I, like many others, see today the most complete implementation of what I call “empirical science.”

The goals of science that I have in mind are completely different from those just named. However, I do not attempt to justify them by presenting these goals as the true or essential goals of science. This would only confuse our problem and would be a relapse into positivist dogmatism. As far as I understand, there is only one way to rationally justify my approach. The essence of this path is the analysis of its logical consequences in order to identify its fruitfulness, that is, the ability to explain the problems of the theory of knowledge.

Thus, I freely acknowledge that in formulating my approach I was ultimately guided by considerations of value judgment and certain preferences. However, I hope that my approach may well be acceptable to those who value not only logical rigor but also freedom from dogmatism, who strive for the practical applicability of science, but are even more captivated by the adventurous spirit of science and those discoveries that, again and again posing new and unexpected questions to us, they require us to formulate new answers that we had never even dreamed of before.

The fact that my concept was put forward under the influence of value considerations does not mean that I am making the same mistake for which I condemned the positivists, that is, trying to destroy metaphysics by labeling it. I do not even go so far as to say that metaphysics has no value for empirical science. It cannot be denied that along with metaphysical ideas that put obstacles in the way of scientific progress, there were others, such as speculative atomism, that contributed to it. Considering scientific knowledge from a psychological point of view, I am inclined to think that scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas of a purely speculative, speculative type, which are often very vague, a faith that is completely unjustified from the point of view of science and in this respect “metaphysical” (cf. . Also ).

Taking into account what has been said regarding metaphysics, I still believe that the primary task of the logic of knowledge is to put forward concepts of empirical science in order to make the linguistic use of the terms, now somewhat vague, perhaps more definite, and in order to make a clear demarcation between science and metaphysics, although the latter may have stimulated the development of science throughout its history.

5. Experience as a method

The task we have set—to formulate an acceptable definition of the concept “empirical science”—is not without difficulties. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that there seem to be many theoretical systems, having a logical structure very similar to the structure of the theoretical system that at any given time is given by scientists as the system of empirical science they accept. Sometimes this situation is described as follows: there is a huge, probably infinite, number of “logically possible worlds”, and the system called “empirical science”, in its intended purpose, is described only one world - “the real world”, or “the world of our experience”.

In order to clarify the statement made, we can formulate three requirements that our empirical-theoretical system must satisfy. Firstly, it must be synthetic, that is, to describe a consistent, possible world. Secondly, it must satisfy the criterion of demarcation (cf. sections 6 and 21), that is, not be a metaphysical system, and describe the world of the possible experience. Thirdly, it must differ in some way from other such systems as depicting precisely our world of experience.

How can one distinguish such a system depicting our world of experience? The answer to this question is that what sets this system apart from other similar systems is that it has been subjected to tests and has passed them. This means that such a system should be identified on the basis of applying to it the same deductive method, the analysis and description of which I set as my goal.

“Experience” from this point of view appears in the form of a specific method, by which we can distinguish one theoretical system from others. Therefore, we can say that science is characterized not only by its logical form, but, in addition, by its specific method.(This same view, of course, is also shared by inductivists, who try to characterize empirical science by referring to its use of the inductive method.)

In accordance with the above, the theory of knowledge, the tasks of which includes the analysis of the method or procedures characteristic of empirical science, can be presented as the theory of the empirical method - a theory of what is commonly called “experience.”

INTRODUCTION

Logic is one of the oldest branches of scientific knowledge and has been an essential general cultural phenomenon since the beginning of its emergence as a science. The role of logic in the modern world of science is important and multifaceted. It is clear that over time the orientation of logical research changes, logical methods are improved, and new trends arise that meet the needs of scientific and technological progress.

It is interesting to note that after the fall of ancient civilization, the first thing that was restored from ancient science was Aristotle's logic. The negative position of the Middle Ages towards all ancient science is known, but its fundamental recognition began precisely with the first seven chapters of Aristotle's Analysts.

During the Renaissance, the logical methods discovered in antiquity were again the first to be restored and actively used. From this begins the philosophy of R. Descartes and other thinkers, from this time all the science of modern times begins.

Aristotle is credited with creating logic as a means of defending truth and exposing sophistry. It is in these qualities that it has been indispensable for more than two millennia. During the Middle Ages, scholastics continued to develop problems of logic. They introduced Latin terminology into logic. F. Bacon explored the foundations of inductive reasoning. The studies of the outstanding German philosopher and mathematician W. Leibniz laid the foundation for the second stage of logic - symbolic logic (mid-19th century).

When writing a textbook on logic, a rather difficult problem arises due to the amazing successes of symbolic logic. As a result of these successes, especially in the field of the theory of logical inference and logical semantics, the idea arose about the uselessness of traditional logic. However, people, like two thousand years ago, continue to reason, prove, and refute using natural language. And here, the apparatus of traditional logic is an effective means.

In this regard, the question arises: how to combine the teaching of traditional logic with the results of symbolic logic? In symbolic logic, many problems of traditional logic are illuminated in a new way, for example, problems of judgments with relations, complex judgments, logical laws, and the like. Symbolic logic opened up new forms of reasoning and new types of logical connections. Therefore, it is simply impossible to talk about traditional logic now without taking into account the achievements of symbolic logic.

And yet, how to combine the material of traditional and symbolic logics in one course? It is clear that these are two different logical systems, two different stages of one science, but we are talking about logic as an academic discipline and here this combination is necessary.

So, the main difficulty of this situation lies in the fundamental difference between traditional and symbolic logic when approaching the analysis of reasoning. Traditional logic analyzes thinking, in particular its forms such as concept, judgment, inference, and symbolic logic studies language, or rather its semantic content, and therefore it is not about the forms of thinking, but about the terms and utterances of language.

It is difficult to combine these two approaches. Therefore, when teaching traditional logic, it makes sense to use the results of symbolic logic, where it sheds deeper light on a certain problem or adds something new. To some extent, Jan Łukasiewicz's coverage of Aristotelian syllogistic can be exemplary in this regard.

All this was taken into account when writing this textbook.

Subject of logic

Definition of logic as a science

Logic as an independent science has a long history. The word “logic” itself comes from the Greek word “logos”, which means: word, meaning, thought, speech.

There are several meanings of the word "logic". Let's name the most common ones and point out those that will be used in this textbook.

Firstly, the word “logic” denotes the patterns of emergence, patterns of existence, patterns of development of things and phenomena of the surrounding world (in these cases, the following expressions are used: “logic of things”, “logic of the historical process”, “logic of events”, etc. ). That is, when they want to emphasize that certain phenomena and things have corresponding patterns, objective reasons, they turn to this meaning of the word “logic.”

Secondly, the word “logic” refers to the consistency, consistency, and validity of our reasoning. In this case, the most commonly used phrases are: “he has excellent logic,” he masters logic,” or “he has no logic,” “he has bad logic,” etc. In other words, when someone is consistent, consistent, explains something reasonably to the interlocutor or the audience, we say: “he has good logic.” And when someone inconsistently, contradictorily tries to convey information to the interlocutor or the audience, then we confirm that “he lacks logic.”

Thirdly, the word “logic” refers to a person’s ability to reflect the world around him through thinking. In these conditions, it is appropriate to use the following phrases: “logic is inherent in man,” “logic is inherent in man,” etc. These phrases emphasize the special nature of man’s relationship to the world. Unlike all living things, man mediates his relationship to the world through thinking, or puts it between himself and the world of thinking. This explains the situation that a person, unlike representatives of the animal world, evaluates objects and phenomena of the surrounding world not as objects that exist around her, but first as objects, and then as the results of his own transformative activity. If for an animal, for example, a tree is an object that needs to be bypassed, or broken when it interferes with movement in the appropriate direction, then for a person a tree is an object of activity from which it can build a house, a boat, get paper, etc. .; wind is the element that inflates the sails of a ship, rotates the turbine of a wind power plant, etc.

Fourthly, the word “logic” refers to an academic discipline that for many centuries was a mandatory element of the European education system. This means that logic has always been taught in educational institutions in Europe since ancient times.

Finally, fifthly, the word “logic” denotes a special science of thinking.

Pointing out that “Logic is a special science of thinking,” thereby emphasizing that thinking as an object of study is not the prerogative of logic alone.

In addition to logic and thinking, sciences such as physiology of higher nervous activity, psychology, and philosophy are also studied. Each of these sciences explores its own specific aspect of thinking.

For example, the physiology of higher nervous activity analyzes thinking taking into account the material processes that constitute the physiological basis of thinking. Psychology considers thinking (along with emotions and will) as one of the components of a person’s inner (spiritual) world. Cybernetics studies the process of thinking through its modeling in the form of special schemes, with the help of which the perception, memorization and processing of information is carried out in order to transfer it to other objects.

Logic examines thinking from the perspective of those laws that guide a person in the process of learning the truth. More precisely: logic is interested in how true knowledge functions and “lives”, how it is possible to obtain new truths from previously established and verified truths, without turning to practice in each specific case, but only by applying special rules and laws of thinking.

One of the main tasks of logic, as a science of thinking, is that logic takes into account only the form, the method of obtaining new knowledge. It explores the way of obtaining new knowledge without connecting the form of knowledge with its specific content.

Just as grammar studies the forms of a single word and the forms of combinations of words in a sentence, abstracting from the specific content of linguistic expressions, just as mathematics considers quantitative and spatial relations outside of specific material objects, so logic analyzes the forms of individual thoughts and the forms of their combination outside the specific content of concepts, judgments, conclusions.

To justify this, let's look at an example. Let's take two considerations:

In each of these considerations, two thoughts justify the third. In terms of content, apparently, these arguments are different. One relates to astronomy, and the second to law. But the way of connecting the constituent parts of the content in both reasoning is the same: “If an object has a certain property and if everything that has this property has a certain second property, then the object in question also has this second property.”

Taking into account the indicated feature of the aspect of thinking, which is the object of the study of logic, it should be noted that logic is part of spiritual culture precisely because it forms a culture of thinking. This formation is one of the factors of the practical significance of logic, and this, in fact, determined the universality of logic as an academic discipline.

What does the concept of “culture of thinking” mean? First of all, a conscious attitude to the reasoning process, that is, the ability to correctly construct evidence, refutations, draw analogies, put forward hypotheses, find and eliminate errors in one’s own and others’ reasoning. Just as knowledge of the rules of grammar gives us the opportunity to perfectly construct words, sentences, phrases, so knowledge of the rules and laws of logic, providing a culture of thinking, causes the necessary systematicity, consistency, validity and persuasiveness of our reasoning.

Under the influence of their own or acquired experience, each person develops certain elements of a culture of thinking (without special study of the laws and rules of logic). But a person who has not studied logic can “feel” logical errors in reasoning, but she is not able to consciously and skillfully get rid of it.

Let's illustrate this with examples. Let's take a deliberately false reasoning, known since ancient times:

The inappropriateness of the resulting conclusion follows from the unfounded identification of completely non-identical concepts. We are talking about the word "good" used in the initial ideas that precede the conclusion. In the first thought, the word “good” has a different meaning of evaluating a specific thing, an action (taking medicine prescribed by a doctor, for a specific person in a specific respect - useful). Here the word “good” means the practical expediency of a certain thing or action. In the second thought, the word “good” is used ethically, as opposed to the concept of “evil.”

Let's consider another consideration reported by the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras (481 - 411 BC).

“An agreement was concluded between the student, whose name was Euathlus, and the teacher of wisdom and eloquence, Protagoras, according to which Protagoras would receive tuition fees after Euathlus had completed his studies. This would be Euathlus’ fee for the first trial he won.

But after completing his studies, Euathlus did not take up litigation and therefore believed that he was obliged to pay Protagoras a fee for his studies. Then the teacher, threatening to go to court, said to Evatl:

The judges will either award you a fee or not. In both cases you will have to pay. In the first case - by a court verdict, in the second - in accordance with our agreement, then this will be the first case you win.

To this Evatl replied:

I won’t pay in either the first or second case. If I am sentenced to pay, I will not pay because I lost my first trial. If I am not sentenced to pay the fee, then I will not pay according to the court verdict."

The fallacy of this reasoning lies in the fact that within a specific reasoning the same person is simultaneously taken in different relations. That is, the student is both a lawyer who lost the trial and a defendant who was acquitted by the court.

§l
Philosophy is deprived of the advantage that other sciences have. It cannot start from the premise that its objects are directly recognized as representation and that its method of knowledge is predetermined as to its starting point and further development. True, she studies the same subjects as religion. Philosophy and religion have truth as their subject, and precisely truth in the highest sense of the word - in the sense that God, and he alone, is truth. Further, both are concerned with the realm of the finite, nature and the human spirit, and their relationship to each other and to God as their truth. Philosophy can, therefore, presuppose familiarity with its objects, and it must even presuppose it, as well as interest in its objects, if only because consciousness forms ideas about objects before concepts about them, and only passing through representations and turning its activity towards them, the thinking spirit rises to thinking knowledge and comprehension through concepts.
But when one begins to think about objects, it soon becomes clear that it contains the requirement to show the necessity of its content and to prove both the very being and the definition of its objects. Thus, it turns out that the initial acquaintance with these objects, given by ideas, is not enough and that unsubstantiated assumptions or statements are unacceptable. At the same time, however, a difficulty is revealed, which consists in the fact that philosophy must begin with something, while every beginning as an immediate one constitutes its own premise, or rather, is itself such a premise.
§ 2
Philosophy can be tentatively defined in general as a thinking consideration of objects. But if it is true - and this, of course, is true - that man differs from animals in thinking, then everything human is such only because it is produced by thinking. Since, however, philosophy is a special way of thinking, a way of thinking thanks to which it becomes knowledge, and at the same time knowledge in concepts, then philosophical thinking differs, further, from that thinking that is active in everything human and imparts to everything human its humanity , being at the same time identical with it, since in itself there is only one thinking. This difference is due to the fact that the content of human consciousness, which has thinking as its basis, appears at first not in the form of thought, but in the form of feeling, contemplation, idea - in forms that must be distinguished from thinking as a form.
Note. According to a position that has been rooted for a long time, which has turned into a truism, man differs from animals in thinking; This position may seem trivial, but at the same time it is surprising that such an ancient belief has to be recalled. Meanwhile, this is necessary in view of the prejudice of our time, which separates feeling and thinking from each other to such an extent that it recognizes them as opposite and even hostile to each other and therefore believes that feeling, and especially religious feeling, is desecrated, distorted and, perhaps, , is even destroyed by thinking and as if religion and religiosity in essence are not at all rooted and do not reside in thinking. With such a division, they forget that only man is capable of having religion and that animals are just as little capable of having religion as they are of law and morality.
When religion is separated from thinking, they usually mean thinking, which can be called reflection (Nachdenken) - reflective thinking, making thoughts as such their content and bringing to consciousness. The sloppiness generated by inattention to this distinction concerning thinking, ignorance of this distinction, which is precisely defined by philosophy, gives rise to the crudest ideas about the latter and brings upon it the wildest reproaches. Since only man possesses religion, law and morality, and since he possesses them only because he is a thinking being, then the entire content of law, religion and morality - whether this content is given by feeling, belief or idea - did not occur without the participation of thinking; activity and products of thinking are contained and given in them. But it is one thing to have such feelings and ideas that are defined and imbued with thinking, and another thing to have thoughts about such feelings and ideas. Thoughts generated by reflection about these methods of consciousness constitute reflection, reasoning, etc., as well as philosophy.
This has often led to the dominance of the erroneous assertion that such reflection is a necessary condition and even the only path along which we achieve an idea of ​​the eternal and true. So, for example, metaphysical proofs of the existence of God (now a thing of the past) were presented as something, knowledge of which and conviction of which alone leads to faith and conviction in the existence of God. This statement is similar to the statement that we cannot eat without first learning the chemical, botanical and zoological definitions of food, and that we must wait with digestion until the study of anatomy and physiology is completed. It would seem that in this case the usefulness of these sciences in their field, as well as philosophy in its field, greatly increases and even reaches the level of absolute and universal necessity. It is more likely, however, that, instead of being necessary, these sciences would then not exist at all.
§ 3
The content that fills our consciousness, whatever its kind, constitutes the certainty of feelings, contemplations, images, ideas, goals, duties, etc., as well as thoughts and concepts. Feeling, contemplation, image, etc. are therefore forms of such content, which remains the same whether it is felt, contemplated, imagined or desired, whether it is only felt without any admixture of thought, or felt, contemplated, etc. .with an admixture of thoughts, or, finally, only thinkable. In any of these forms or in a mixture of several such forms, the content constitutes the object of consciousness. But when the content becomes an object of consciousness, the peculiarities of these forms also penetrate into the content, so that, according to each of them, a special object appears, and what is in itself one and the same can be considered as different content.
Note. Since the features of feeling, contemplation, desire, will, etc., insofar as we are aware of them, are generally called representations, we can generally say that philosophy replaces representations with thoughts, categories, or, more precisely, concepts. Representations can generally be seen as metaphors for thoughts and concepts. But, although we have ideas, we do not yet know their meaning for thinking, we do not yet know the thoughts and concepts underlying them. And vice versa, it is not the same thing to have thoughts and concepts and to know what ideas, contemplations, and feelings correspond to them. Partly due to this circumstance is what is called the incomprehensibility of philosophy. The difficulty consists, on the one hand, in the inability, and this inability is essentially only the absence of the habit - to think abstractly, that is, to fix pure thoughts and move in them. In our ordinary consciousness, thoughts are connected with familiar sensory and spiritual material; in thinking, reflection and reasoning, we mix thoughts with feelings, contemplations, ideas (in every sentence, even if its content is completely sensual, there are already categories; for example, in the sentence “This leaf is green” there are categories of being, singularity). But it is completely different to make thoughts themselves the subject, without the admixture of other elements. Another reason for the incomprehensibility of philosophy is the impatient desire to have before oneself in the form of a representation what is in consciousness as a thought and concept. We often come across the expression: it is unknown what needs to be thought of under a concept; but at the same time there is no need to think of anything other than the concept itself. The meaning of this expression, however, is a longing for an already familiar, habitual idea: consciousness has a feeling as if, along with the form of the idea, the ground on which it previously stood firmly and confidently was taken away; consciousness transferred to the pure realm of concepts does not know in which world it lives. Therefore, writers, preachers, speakers, etc., are found most understandable when they present to their readers or listeners things that the latter know by heart in advance, that are familiar to them and understandable by themselves.
§ 4
Philosophy must first of all prove to our everyday consciousness that there is a need for a properly philosophical way of cognition, or even must awaken such a need. But in relation to the objects of religion, in relation to truth in general, she must show that she herself is capable of knowing them. In relation to the revealed difference between it and religious ideas, it must justify its own definitions, which are different from the latter.
§ 5
For a preliminary explanation of the above difference and the related position that the true content of our consciousness, when transformed into the form of thought and concept, is preserved and even, strictly speaking, for the first time revealed in its true light, we can remind the reader of another long-standing belief , which states that to know the truth in objects and events, as well as in feelings, contemplations, opinions, ideas, etc., reflection is required. But thinking always turns feelings, ideas, etc. into thoughts.
Note. Since it is thinking that is the strictly philosophical form of activity, and every person is naturally capable of thinking, then, since the difference between concepts and representations (indicated in § 3) is missed, exactly the opposite happens to what, as we mentioned above, often constitutes the subject complaints about the incomprehensibility of philosophy. This science is often so neglected that even those who have not studied it imagine that without any study they understand how matters stand with philosophy, and that, having received an ordinary education and relying especially on religious feeling, they can casually philosophize and judge philosophy. Regarding other sciences, it is believed that study is required in order to know them, and that only such knowledge gives the right to judge them. They also agree that in order to make a shoe, you need to study shoemaking and practice it, although every person has a measure in his foot for this, has hands and thanks to them the natural dexterity required for this work. Only philosophizing does not require this kind of study and work. This convenient opinion has been established in modern times thanks to the doctrine of direct knowledge - knowledge through contemplation.
§ 6
On the other hand, it is equally important for philosophy to understand that its content is nothing other than that content that was originally generated and is now still generated in the realm of the living spirit, forming the world, the external and internal world of consciousness, in other words, that its reality is the content. We call the closest consciousness of this content experience. A thoughtful consideration of the world already distinguishes between that which, in the vast realm of external and internal existence, is only transient and insignificant, just a phenomenon, and that which in itself truly deserves the name of reality. Since philosophy differs only in form from other types of awareness of this content, it is necessary that it be consistent with reality and experience. One can even consider this consistency at least as an external touchstone of the truth of philosophical teaching, while the highest ultimate goal of science is the reconciliation of the self-conscious mind with the existing mind, with reality, generated by the knowledge of this consistency.
Note. In the preface to my “Philosophy of Law” there are the following provisions:
What is reasonable is real, and what is real is reasonable19.
These simple propositions seemed strange to many and were attacked even by those who consider their knowledge of philosophy and, of course, also of religion indisputable. It is unnecessary to refer to religion in this regard, since its teaching about the divine world order quite definitely contains these provisions. As for their philosophical meaning, we had the right to assume that the critics were so educated as to know not only that God is real, that he is the most real, that he alone is truly real, but with regard to the formal side of these propositions also that that existence (Dasein) is partly a phenomenon and
only part of reality. In everyday life, every whim, error, evil, and the like is called reality, as well as every existence, no matter how perverse and transitory it may be. But a person who has even an ordinary sense of language will not agree that contingent existence deserves the loud name of actual; the contingent is an existence that has no greater value than the possible, which could equally be and could not be.
When I spoke about reality, it was the duty of the critics to think in what sense I was using this expression, since in the detailed “Logic” I also consider reality and distinguish it not only from the accidental, which, after all, also has existence, but also and from actual being, existence and other definitions.
The idea that ideas and ideals are only chimeras and that philosophy is a system of such empty fictions rebels against the reality of the rational; Against it, the opposite idea equally arises, that ideas and ideals are something too high to have reality, or something too weak to achieve it. But what most readily separates reality from ideas is reason, which accepts the dreams of its abstractions as something true and is proud of the ought, which it especially readily prescribes also in the field of politics, as if the world was just waiting for it to find out what it should be, but what od is not; for if the world were the way it should be, then where would the dilapidated reasoning of the ought put forward by reason go? When reason is directed with its ought against trivial external and transitory objects, institutions, states, etc., which, perhaps, may be of relatively great importance, but only for a certain time and for certain circles, then it may turn out to be right and discover in these objects much that does not agree with universal true definitions; Who is not smart enough to notice many things around him that in reality are not what they should be?
But this wisdom is wrong in imagining that, dealing with such subjects and their oughts, it is in the sphere of interests of the philosophical science. The latter is concerned only with the idea, which is not so powerless that it only ought to be and not really be; it is, therefore, concerned with a reality in which these objects, institutions, states, etc. form only a superficial, external side.
§ 7
Since reflection, first of all, contains in itself the general principle (we use this word here also in the sense of the beginning) of philosophy and again blossomed in its independence in modern times (after Luther’s Reformation), and did not stop from the very beginning, as the first philosophical attempts once did Greeks, on abstractions, and also attacked the seemingly immeasurable material of the world of phenomena, then philosophy began to be called any knowledge, the subject of which is the knowledge of a stable measure and the universal in a sea of ​​empirical singularities, the study of necessity, law in the seeming disorder of an infinite number of accidents, therefore, knowledge, which at the same time draws its content from its own contemplation and perception of the external and internal, in the present nature, as well as in the present spirit, and in the human heart.
Note. The principle of experience contains the infinitely important proposition that the acceptance and recognition of any content requires that a person himself participate in it, or, to put it more specifically, it requires that he find such content consistent with and united with his own self-confidence ; he must himself accept and acknowledge the content of experience, either only with his outer senses, or also with his deepest spirit, his essential self-consciousness.
This is the same principle that is currently called faith, direct knowledge, external and especially one’s own internal revelation.
Those sciences which have thus received the name of philosophy, according to the above principle, we call, from their point of departure, empirical sciences. The important thing is that their essential goal and result are laws, universal provisions, theories, thoughts about what exists. So, for example, Newton called his physics the philosophy of nature, and Hugo Gratius, based on a comparison of the behavior of peoples in relation to each other and with the help of ordinary reasoning, created a theory that was called the philosophy of international public law. Among the English, the name philosophy has retained this meaning to this day, and Newton continues to be glorified there as a great philosopher. Even in the price lists of instrument manufacturers, those instruments that are not included under the special heading of magnetic or electrical apparatus - thermometers, barometers, etc. - are called philosophical instruments. We must, of course, note in this regard that it is not the combination of wood, iron, etc., but thinking alone that should be called an instrument of philosophy *. In particular, political economy is called philosophy, a science that owes its emergence to modern times. We usually call it the science of rational state economy**.
* The journal published by Thomson also bears the title: “Annals of Philosophy, or Journal of Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, Natural History, Agriculture and the Arts.” From this enumeration, the reader can form his own idea of ​​what subjects are called philosophical here. Among the announcements of newly published books, I recently came across the following title in an English newspaper: “The Art of preserving the Hair on philosophical principles, neatly printed in post 8, price 7 sh.” 20. The philosophical principles of preserving hair probably meant chemical , physiological, etc. principles.
** English statesmen, even in public speeches, often use the expression “philosophical principles” to denote universal political and economic principles. At a meeting of Parliament in 1825 (February 2), in the debate about the reply to the speech from the throne, Brougham expressed himself as follows: “The worthy statesman and philosophical principles of free trade - for there is no doubt that these are philosophical principles - on the adoption of which His Majesty congratulated parliament”, etc. But this member of the opposition was not the only one who spoke in this way. At the annual banquet given the same month by the Maritime Commerce Society, presided over by the First Minister, the Earl of Liverpool, with Secretary of State Canning and Paymaster-General of the Army Sir Charles Long sitting next to him, toasting his health, Secretary of State Canning said: "Recently a new period has begun when ministers can apply to the government of this country the wise rules of profound philosophy.” No matter how different English philosophy may be from German, when in other places this word is used as a mocking nickname or as something abusive, it is still gratifying to see that tribute is still paid to it by the statesmen of England.
§ 8
No matter how satisfactory this knowledge is in its field, it still turns out, firstly, that there is another circle of objects that are not included in its field - freedom, spirit, God. They cannot be found on the basis of this knowledge, not because they do not belong to the field of experience (they, however, are not perceived in sensory experience, but everything that is generally in consciousness - even a tautological position - is perceived in experience), but because that these objects, in their content, immediately appear as infinite.
Note. There is an old proposition which is erroneously attributed to Aristotle in the sense that it expresses the point of view of his philosophy. This position says: “Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu” - “there is nothing in thinking that is not in feeling, in experience.” If speculative philosophy did not want to agree with this, then it must be recognized as a misunderstanding. But she also asserted the opposite position: “Nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in intellectu” - in the completely general sense that vous21 and, in a deeper definition, spirit is the cause of the world, and further (see § 2), that legal, moral, religious feeling is a feeling and, therefore, an experimental experience of such content that has its root and its existence only in thinking.
§ 9
Secondly, the subjective mind demands further satisfaction regarding the form of knowledge; this form is a necessity in general (see § 1). However, on the one hand, in experimental knowledge, the universal, genus, etc. contained in it has the character of something in itself indefinite, not in itself connected with the particular; on the contrary, the universal and the particular are external and random in relation to each other to a friend; in the same way, special objects connected with each other, taken for oneself, appear as external to each other and random. On the other hand, this knowledge always begins with the immediate, the pre-found, with the prerequisites. In both respects the form of necessity does not find its satisfaction here. Reflection, insofar as it is aimed at satisfying this need, is philosophical thinking in the proper sense of the word, speculative thinking22. As a reflection, which, although it has something in common with the reflection of the first kind, is at the same time different from it, it, in addition to the forms common to both of them, also has forms peculiar to it alone, which all reduce to the form of the concept.
Note. This shows the relationship of speculative science to other sciences. It does not throw aside the empirical content of the latter, but recognizes it, uses it and makes it its own content: it also recognizes the universal in these sciences, laws, genera, etc., but it introduces other categories into these categories and retains them . The difference, then, consists only in this change of categories. Speculative logic contains the previous logic and metaphysics, preserves the same forms of thought, laws and objects, but at the same time develops them further and transforms them with the help of new categories.
One must distinguish between a concept in the speculative sense and what is usually called a concept. The statement, repeated thousands and thousands of times and turned into a prejudice, that the infinite cannot be comprehended through a concept, means the concept in the latter, one-sided sense.
§ 10
This philosophical thinking itself requires that its necessity be understood and its ability to cognize absolute objects be justified. But such understanding and justification is in itself philosophical knowledge and therefore can only take place within philosophy. The preliminary explanation, therefore, would not be philosophical and could not be anything other than a series of premises, assurances and reasoning, that is, random statements, to which, with the same right and equally without evidence, the opposite provisions could be opposed.
Note. One of the main provisions of critical philosophy is that, before proceeding to the knowledge of God, the essence of things, etc., we must examine the very ability of knowledge in order to make sure whether it can give us knowledge of these objects, we should get acquainted with the tool before undertaking the work that is to be done with it; if this instrument is not satisfactory, the labor spent will be in vain. This idea seemed so convincing that it aroused the greatest admiration and universal agreement, so that knowledge, distracted from its interest in objects and ceasing to deal with them, turned to itself, to the formal side. If, however, one does not deceive oneself with words, it is easy to see that while other instruments can be examined and appreciated in a way other than through the performance of the work for which they are intended, the study of knowledge is possible only in the process of knowledge and considered so the so-called instrument of knowledge means nothing more than to know it. But the desire to know before embarking on knowledge is as absurd as the wise intention of that scholastic who wanted to learn to swim before throwing himself into the water.
Reingold24, who understood the confusion that plagues such a beginning of philosophizing, proposed, in order to avoid it, to start with hypothetical and problematic philosophizing and to follow this path, it is unknown, however, how, until it turns out that the primary truth (Urwahren) has been achieved. On closer examination, this path reduces to the usual method, namely, the analysis of an empirical basis or preliminary assumption, which is given the form of a definition. It is true that the usual course of research, based on premises and preliminary assumptions, is hypothetical and problematic, but correct understanding does not change the nature of this method, but only immediately reveals its insufficiency.
§ eleven
The need for philosophy can be more closely defined as follows: the spirit, which, as a sentient and contemplative, has the sensory as its object, as an imaginative - images, as a will - goals, etc., in contrast to these forms of its existence and its objects or simply, unlike them, it also satisfies its highest inner essence, thinking, and makes the latter its subject. Thus he comes to himself in the deepest sense of the word, for his principle, his pure, unadulterated self, constitutes thinking. But in doing this, thinking becomes entangled in contradictions, that is, it loses itself in the constant non-identity of thought and, thus, does not reach itself, but, on the contrary, remains captive to its opposite. The highest need of the spirit turns against this result of thinking, which remains only rational, and this highest need is based on the fact that thinking does not renounce itself, but remains true to itself also in this conscious loss of its own being, “in order to overcome and win.” ", in itself resolves its own contradictions.
Note. Understanding that dialectics constitutes the nature of thinking itself, that as reason it must fall into self-negation, into contradiction, understanding this constitutes one of the main aspects of logic. Thinking, having lost hope of resolving the contradiction in which it has placed itself by its own efforts, returns to those resolutions and tranquility that the spirit received in its other forms. However, in this return, thinking does not necessarily fall into misology25, an example of which Plato already had before him; it would not have to polemically speak out against itself, as does the so-called direct knowledge26, which claims that it is the only form of comprehension of truth.
§ 12
Philosophy, which arose from the above need, has as its starting point experience, immediate and reasoning consciousness. Excited by experience as a stimulus, thinking subsequently behaves in such a way that it rises above the natural, sensual and reasoning consciousness into its own, pure, devoid of impurities element and thus places itself at first in a detached (entfernendes), negative relation to this original one. point. It first finds its satisfaction in itself, in the idea of ​​the universal essence of these phenomena; this idea (absolute, god) may be more or less abstract. Experimental sciences, for their part, further serve as a stimulus to overcome the form in which the wealth of their content is offered as only immediate and pre-found, juxtaposed to each other and, therefore, generally random diversity, and to elevate this content into necessity. This stimulus snatches thinking from the indicated universality and satisfaction experienced only in itself and forces it to develop from itself. The latter is, on the one hand, only the perception of the content and the definitions it offers, on the other hand, it simultaneously imparts to this content the form of free development of original (ursprunglichen) thinking, determined only by the necessity of the object itself.
Note. We will have to speak below specifically and in more detail about the relationship in consciousness between immediacy and mediation. Here we must only first draw attention to the fact that, although these two moments appear as different, none of them can be absent, and they are inextricably linked with each other. So, for example, knowledge about God, as well as about everything supersensible in general, is essentially an elevation above sensory sensation or contemplation; it therefore contains within itself a negative relation to this starting point and is thereby mediation. For mediation is a certain beginning and a transition to a certain second, so that this second exists only insofar as it was reached from its “other.” But this does not make knowledge about God any less independent in relation to the empirical side, and, even more than that, it is precisely through this negation and ascension that it imparts its independence to itself. If mediation is transformed into conditionality and one-sidedly emphasized, then we can say that philosophy owes its first emergence to experience (a posteriori), but this, strictly speaking, does not say much, because in fact, thinking is essentially the negation of the immediately given. In the same way, we can say that the process of eating owes its origin to food products, for without them we could not eat. The process of eating, of course, in this regard turns out to be thankless, for it is the absorption of something to which it owes its own existence. In this sense, thinking is no less ungrateful.
But the genuine, reflected into itself and therefore mediated in itself, immediacy of thinking (a priori) is universality, its self-existence in general; thinking here is satisfied in itself, and to that extent it is characterized by indifference to isolation, and at the same time also indifference to its development. Likewise, religion, no matter whether it is more or less developed, whether it has reached the heights of scientific consciousness or remains at the stage of naive faith and heart, has the same intense character, gives the same satisfaction and bliss. If thinking stops at the universality of ideas, as it necessarily happens in the first philosophical teachings (for example, in the existence of the Eleatic school, in the Heraclitean formation, etc.), then it is rightly reproached for formalism. It may happen that in a more developed philosophical teaching only abstract provisions and definitions are formulated (for example, that in the absolute everything is one, that the subjective and objective are identical), which are only repeated when considering the particular. Regarding the first abstract universality of thinking, it is correct and thorough to assert that philosophy owes its development to experience. Empirical sciences, on the one hand, do not stop at observing individual phenomena, but, moving towards philosophy, process the material with the help of thought: looking for universal definitions, genera and laws, they thus prepare the content of the particular so that it can be included into philosophy. On the other hand, they force thinking itself to move to these specific definitions. Perceiving the content of the empirical sciences and removing the form of immediacy and givenness characteristic of it, thinking is at the same time the development of thinking from itself. Philosophy, which thus owes its development to the empirical sciences, imparts to their content the most essential form of freedom of thought (a priori form) and reliability based on knowledge of necessity, which it puts in place of the credibility of pre-found and experimental facts, so that the fact turns into an image and an illustration of the original and completely independent activity of thinking.
§ 13
The emergence and development of philosophy, presented in a peculiar form of external history, is depicted as the history of this science. This form imparts to the stages of development of an idea the character of a random sequence of philosophical teachings and creates the appearance that there are only differences between their principles and the development of the latter. But this work has been carried out for thousands of years by a single living spirit, whose thinking nature consists in the awareness of what it is, and when the latter has thus become its subject, it thereby rises to a higher stage of development. The history of philosophy shows, firstly, that seemingly different philosophical teachings represent only one philosophy at different stages of its development; secondly, that the special principles, each of which lies at the basis of one particular system, are only branches of one and the same whole. The latest philosophical teaching is the result of all previous philosophical teachings and must therefore contain the principles of all of them; therefore, if only it is a philosophical teaching, it is the most developed, the richest and the most concrete.
Note. Because of this appearance of the existence of numerous different philosophies, it is necessary to distinguish the universal from the particular in their own definitions. Taken formally and along with the particular, the universal itself also turns into something special; the inappropriateness and absurdity of such an attitude when applied to objects of everyday life would naturally catch the eye, as if, for example, someone demanded fruit for himself and at the same time refused cherries, pears, grapes, because they are cherries, pears , grapes, not fruits. But when it comes to philosophy, a disdainful attitude towards it is justified by the fact that there are various philosophical teachings and each of them is only one of the philosophies, and not philosophy in general, as if cherries were not also fruits. It also happens that a philosophical teaching, the principle of which is the universal, is placed on a par with such philosophical teachings, the principle of which is the particular, and even with such teachings that assure that philosophy does not exist at all. And this comparison is made on the basis that they all represent only different philosophical points of view. This is the same as if we said that light and darkness are only two different types of light.
§ 14
The same development of thinking that is depicted in the history of philosophy is also depicted in philosophy itself, but here it is freed from external historical circumstances and is given in the element of pure thinking. Free and true thought is concrete in itself, and thus it is a certain idea, and in its complete universality it is the idea as such, or the absolute. The science of it is essentially a system, because the true as concrete is a unity unfolding in itself and preserving itself, that is, totality, and only through difference and the definition of differences can their necessity and the freedom of the whole exist.
Note. Philosophizing without a system cannot have anything scientific in it; In addition to the fact that such philosophizing in itself rather expresses a subjective state of mind, it is also accidental in its content. Any content receives justification only as a moment of the whole, outside of which it is an unfounded assumption, or subjective certainty. Many philosophical works limit themselves to expressing only sentiments and opinions. A system is mistakenly understood as a philosophical doctrine based on a limited, different principle; in fact, the principle of true philosophy is precisely that it contains all the special principles.
§ 15
Each part of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle closed in itself, but each of these parts contains a philosophical idea in its special definiteness or as a special moment of the whole. A separate circle, precisely because it is a totality in itself, breaks through the boundary of its definition and serves as the basis of a broader sphere; the whole is therefore a circle consisting of circles, each of which is a necessary moment, so that their system constitutes an integral idea, which at the same time also manifests itself in each of them separately27
§ 16
In the Encyclopedia science is not presented in detailed development of its special parts; The "Encyclopedia" should be limited only to the presentation of the principles and basic concepts of individual sciences.
Note . How many special parts are required to construct a special science remains uncertain insofar as a part, in order to represent the true, must in turn be not an isolated moment, but a whole. Philosophy as a whole therefore constitutes a truly unified science, but it can also be considered as a whole consisting of several special sciences. The philosophical encyclopedia differs from other ordinary encyclopedias in that the latter are an aggregate of sciences, connected in a random and empirical way, an aggregate of sciences, among which there are those that only bear the name of science, but in fact there is a bare collection of information. Since the sciences are included in this aggregate only externally, their unity is an external unity, an arrangement in a certain order. Therefore, and also because the material of the sciences is random in nature, this order must remain just an attempt and constantly reveal its unsatisfactory nature. So, the following cannot find a place in the philosophical encyclopedia: 1) simple aggregates of information, such as, for example, philology. In addition, it cannot include 2) sciences that are based only on arbitrariness, such as heraldry; sciences of the latter kind are thoroughly positive; 3) other types of sciences, which are also called positive, but, however, have a rational basis and beginning. Only this rational side of the sciences belongs to philosophy, while the other, positive side remains exclusively their own property. The positive in the sciences has a different character: 1) the rational principle of science in itself turns into a random one due to the fact that the universal is relegated to the area of ​​empirical singularity and reality. In this realm of variability and chance, the concept has no force, and only the foundations can have force. Jurisprudence, for example, or the system of direct and indirect taxes require final, precise decisions that lie outside the limits of the in-itself and for-itself of a certain concept, and therefore they leave wide room for definitions, which can be one or the other depending on the chosen grounds, and thus do not have final certainty. In the same way, the idea of ​​nature, taken in its individuality, wanders in the realm of chance; Natural history, geography, medicine, etc., arrive at definitions of existence, to species and distinctions, which depend on external chance and arbitrariness, and not on reason. History also belongs to this category of sciences, since its essence is the idea, and its phenomena are random and belong to the realm of arbitrariness. 2) The sciences are also positive insofar as they do not know that their definitions are finite and do not show the transition of these definitions to a higher sphere, but simply take them as cash. In these sciences the finitude of the form appears before us, just as in the sciences of the first kind the finitude of the material appears. Connected with this finitude of form is 3) the finitude of the basis of knowledge, which basis is partly resonance, partly feeling, faith, the authority of others, in general the authority of internal and external contemplation. This also includes that philosophy that bases itself on anthropology, the facts of consciousness, internal contemplation or external experience. It may, however, happen that only the form of scientific presentation is empirical, and thoughtful contemplation organizes what are only phenomena in a way that corresponds to the internal movement of the concept. Such empirical sciences are characterized by the fact that, due to the opposition to each other of the variety of comparable phenomena, external, random conditions are omitted, as a result of which the universal appears before the mental gaze. Intelligent experimental physics, history, etc., will thus depict the rational science of nature, human events and affairs in the form of an image that is the external image of the concept.
§ 17
As for the beginning of philosophy, then, apparently, it should, just like other sciences, begin with a subjective premise, namely with some special object; if in other sciences the subject of thinking is space, number, etc., then philosophy must make thinking itself the subject of thinking. But this is a free act of thinking; it freely takes on the point of view from which it exists for itself and, therefore, itself generates and gives itself its object. Further, the point of view, which is thus immediate, must, within the limits of philosophical science, transform itself into a result, and precisely into its final result, in which it again reaches its beginning and returns to itself. Thus, philosophy turns out to be a circle returning to itself, without a beginning in the sense in which other sciences have a beginning, since its beginning relates only to the subject who decides to philosophize, and not to science as such. Or, to express the same thing in other words, the concept of science and, consequently, the first concept (being the first concept, it contains a bifurcation, consisting in the fact that thinking is an object, as it were, for an external philosophizing subject) must be comprehended by science itself. Moreover, the only aim and business of science is to reach the concept of its concept and thus arrive at its starting point and its satisfaction.
§ 18
Just as it is impossible to give a preliminary general idea of ​​philosophy, for only the integrity of science is the image of an idea, in the same way its division into separate parts can be understood only from this image of the idea; this division, like the general idea of ​​philosophy from which it must be drawn, represents a certain anticipation. But the idea reveals itself as the simplicity of self-identical thinking and at the same time as an activity consisting in the fact that thinking opposes itself to itself in order to be for itself and in this other still be only with itself. Thus, science breaks down into the following three parts:
I. Logic is the science of the idea in itself and for itself.
II. Philosophy of nature as a science about the idea in its otherness.
III. Philosophy of spirit as an idea returning to itself from its otherness.
Above, in § 15, we noticed that the differences between individual philosophical sciences are only definitions of the idea itself and only this idea manifests itself in these various moments. In nature we do not know anything other than the idea, but the idea exists here in the form of externalization (Entauperung),28 external detection, just as in the spirit this same idea is existing for itself and becoming in itself and for itself. The definition in which the idea appears is at the same time a fluid moment; therefore, a separate science is simultaneously both knowledge of its content as an existing object, and knowledge directly in this content of its transition to its higher circle. The idea of ​​the division of sciences is incorrect because it takes individual parts or sciences as adjacent, as if they, like species, were only at rest and substantial in their difference.

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